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Image Quality Assessment
for Fake Biometric Detection: Application to
Iris, Fingerprint and Face Recognition
Javier Galbally, Se´bastien Marcel Member, IEEE and Julian Fierrez
Abstract—To ensure the actual presence of a real legitimate
trait in contrast to a fake self-manufactured synthetic or
reconstructed sample, is a significant problem in biometric
authentication, which requires the development of new and
efficient protection measures. In this work we present a novel
software-based fake detection method which can be used
in multiple biometric systems to detect different types of
fraudulent access attempts. The objective of the proposed
system is to enhance the security of biometric recognition
frameworks, by adding liveness assessment in a fast, user-
friendly and non-intrusive manner, through the use of Image
Quality Assessment (IQA). The proposed approach presents
a very low degree of complexity which makes it suitable
for real-time applications, using 25 general image quality
features extracted from one image (i.e., the same acquired for
authentication purposes) to distinguish between legitimate and
impostor samples. The experimental results, obtained on pub-
licly available datasets of fingerprint, iris and 2-D face, show
that the proposed method is highly competitive compared
to other state-of-the-art approaches and that the analysis of
the general image quality of real biometric samples reveals
highly valuable information that may be very efficiently used
to discriminate them from fake traits.
Index Terms—Image quality assessment, Biometrics, Secu-
rity, Attacks, Countermeasures.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, the increasing interest in the evaluationof biometric systems security has led to the creation of
numerous and very diverse initiatives focused on this major
field of research [1]: the publication of many research works
disclosing and evaluating different biometric vulnerabilities
[2], [3], the proposal of new protection methods [4], [5],
related book chapters [6], the publication of several stan-
dards in the area [7], [8], the dedication of specific tracks,
sessions and workshops in biometric-specific and general
signal processing conferences [9], the organization of com-
petitions focused on vulnerability assessment [10], [11],
the acquisition of specific datasets [12], [13], the creation
of groups and laboratories specialized in the evaluation of
biometric security [14], or the existence of several European
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Projects with the biometric security topic as main research
interest [15], [16].
All these initiatives clearly highlight the importance
given by all parties involved in the development of bio-
metrics (i.e., researchers, developers and industry) to the
improvement of the systems security to bring this rapidly
emerging technology into practical use.
Among the different threats analyzed, the so-called direct
or spoofing attacks have motivated the biometric commu-
nity to study the vulnerabilities against this type of fraudu-
lent actions in modalities such as the iris [2], the fingerprint
[17], the face [13], the signature [18], or even the gait
[19] and multimodal approaches [20]. In these attacks, the
intruder uses some type of synthetically produced artifact
(e.g., gummy finger, printed iris image or face mask), or
tries to mimic the behaviour of the genuine user (e.g., gait,
signature), to fraudulently access the biometric system. As
this type of attacks are performed in the analog domain
and the interaction with the device is done following the
regular protocol, the usual digital protection mechanisms
(e.g., encryption, digital signature or watermarking) are not
effective.
The aforementioned works and other analogue studies,
have clearly shown the necessity to propose and develop
specific protection methods against this threat. This way,
researchers have focused on the design of specific coun-
termeasures that enable biometric systems to detect fake
samples and reject them, improving this way the robustness
and security level of the systems.
Besides other anti-spoofing approaches such as the use
of multibiometrics or challenge-response methods, special
attention has been paid by researchers and industry to the
liveness detection techniques, which use different physio-
logical properties to distinguish between real and fake traits.
Liveness assessment methods represent a challenging engi-
neering problem as they have to satisfy certain demanding
requirements [21]: (i) non-invasive, the technique should in
no case be harmful for the individual or require an excessive
contact with the user; (ii) user friendly, people should not
be reluctant to use it; (iii) fast, results have to be produced
in a very reduced interval as the user cannot be asked to
interact with the sensor for a long period of time; (iv) low
cost, a wide use cannot be expected if the cost is excessively
high; (v) performance, in addition to having a good fake
detection rate, the protection scheme should not degrade
the recognition performance (i.e., false rejection) of the
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Fig. 1. Types of attacks potentially detected by hardware-based (spoofing) and software-based (spoofing + reconstructed/synthetic samples) liveness
detection techniques.
biometric system.
Liveness detection methods are usually classified into
one of two groups (see Fig. 1): (i) Hardware-based tech-
niques, which add some specific device to the sensor in
order to detect particular properties of a living trait (e.g.,
fingerprint sweat, blood pressure, or specific reflection
properties of the eye); (ii) Software-based techniques, in
this case the fake trait is detected once the sample has
been acquired with a standard sensor (i.e., features used to
distinguish between real and fake traits are extracted from
the biometric sample, and not from the trait itself).
The two types of methods present certain advantages
and drawbacks over the other and, in general, a com-
bination of both would be the most desirable protection
approach to increase the security of biometric systems.
As a coarse comparison, hardware-based schemes usually
present a higher fake detection rate, while software-based
techniques are in general less expensive (as no extra device
is needed), and less intrusive since their implementation
is transparent to the user. Furthermore, as they operate
directly on the acquired sample (and not on the biometric
trait itself), software-based techniques may be embedded in
the feature extractor module which makes them potentially
capable of detecting other types of illegal break-in attempts
not necessarily classified as spoofing attacks. For instance,
software-based methods can protect the system against the
injection of reconstructed or synthetic samples into the
communication channel between the sensor and the feature
extractor [22], [23].
Although, as shown above, a great amount of work has
been done in the field of spoofing detection and many
advances have been reached, the attacking methodologies
have also evolved and become more and more sophisticated.
As a consequence, there are still big challenges to be faced
in the detection of direct attacks.
One of the usual shortcomings of most anti-spoofing
methods is their lack of generality. It is not rare to find that
the proposed approaches present a very high performance
detecting certain type of spoofs (i.e., gummy fingers made
out of silicone), but their efficiency drastically drops when
they are presented with a different type of synthetic trait
(i.e., gummy fingers made out of gelatin). This way, their
error rates vary greatly when the testing conditions are mod-
ified or if the evaluation database is exchanged. Moreover,
the vast majority of current protection methods are based
on the measurement of certain specific properties of a given
trait (e.g., the frequency of ridges and valleys in fingerprints
or the pupil dilation of the eye) which gives them a very
reduced interoperability, as they may not be implemented
in recognition systems based on other biometric modalities
(e.g., face), or even on the same system with a different
sensor.
In the present work we propose a novel software-based
multi-biometric and multi-attack protection method which
targets to overcome part of these limitations through the use
of image quality assessment (IQA). It is not only capable
of operating with a very good performance under differ-
ent biometric systems (multi-biometric) and for diverse
spoofing scenarios, but it also provides a very good level
of protection against certain non-spoofing attacks (multi-
attack). Moreover, being software-based, it presents the
usual advantages of this type of approaches: fast, as it
only needs one image (i.e., the same sample acquired for
biometric recognition) to detect whether it is real or fake;
non-intrusive; user-friendly (transparent to the user); cheap
and easy to embed in already functional systems (as no new
piece of hardware is required).
An added advantage of the proposed technique is its
speed and very low complexity, which makes it very well
suited to operate on real scenarios (one of the desired
characteristics of this type of methods). As it does not
deploy any trait-specific property (e.g., minutiae points, iris
position or face detection), the computation load needed
for image processing purposes is very reduced, using only
general image quality measures fast to compute, combined
with very simple classifiers.
It has been tested on publicly available attack databases
of iris, fingerprint and 2-D face, where it has reached results
fully comparable to those obtained on the same databases
and following the same experimental protocols by more
complex trait-specific top-ranked approaches from the state-
of-the-art.
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Fig. 2. General diagram of the biometric protection method based on Image Quality Assessment (IQA) proposed in the present work. IQM stands
for Image Quality Measure, FR for Full-Reference, and NR for No-Reference. See Fig. 3 for a general classification of the 25 IQMs implemented.
See Table I for the complete list and formal definitions of the 25 IQMs. See Section III for a more detailed description of each IQM.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Some key
concepts about image quality assessment and the rationale
behind its use for biometric protection is given in Section II.
The proposed method is described in Section III. The results
for iris, fingerprint and 2D face evaluation experiments
appear in Sections IV-A, IV-B, and IV-C. Conclusions are
finally drawn in Section V.
II. IMAGE QUALITY ASSESSMENT FOR LIVENESS
DETECTION
The use of image quality assessment for liveness detec-
tion is motivated by the assumption that: “It is expected
that a fake image captured in an attack attempt will have
different quality than a real sample acquired in the normal
operation scenario for which the sensor was designed.”
Expected quality differences between real and fake sam-
ples may include: degree of sharpness, color and luminance
levels, local artifacts, amount of information found in both
type of images (entropy), structural distortions or natural
appearance. For example, iris images captured from a
printed paper are more likely to be blurred or out of focus
due to trembling; face images captured from a mobile
device will probably be over- or under-exposed; and it is not
rare that fingerprint images captured from a gummy finger
present local acquisition artifacts such as spots and patches.
Furthermore, in an eventual attack in which a synthetically
produced image is directly injected to the communication
channel before the feature extractor, this fake sample will
most likely lack some of the properties found in natural
images.
Following this “quality-difference” hypothesis, in the
present research work we explore the potential of general
image quality assessment as a protection method against
different biometric attacks (with special attention to spoof-
ing). As the implemented features do not evaluate any spe-
cific property of a given biometric modality or of a specific
attack, they may be computed on any image. This gives the
proposed method a new multi-biometric dimension which
is not found in previously described protection schemes.
In the current state-of-the-art, the rationale behind the
use of IQA features for liveness detection is supported by
three factors:
 Image quality has been successfully used in previous
works for image manipulation detection [24], [25] and
steganalysis [26], [27] in the forensic field. To a certain
extent, many spoofing attacks, especially those which
involve taking a picture of a facial image displayed
in a 2D device (e.g., spoofing attacks with printed
iris or face images), may be regarded as a type of
image manipulation which can be effectively detected,
as shown in the present research work, by the use of
different quality features.
 In addition to the previous studies in the forensic
area, different features measuring trait-specific quality
properties have already been used for liveness detec-
tion purposes in fingerprint and iris applications [5],
[28]. However, even though these two works give a
solid basis to the use of image quality as a protection
method in biometric systems, none of them is general.
For instance, measuring the ridge and valley frequency
may be a good parameter to detect certain fingerprint
spoofs, but it cannot be used in iris liveness detection.
On the other hand, the amount of occlusion of the eye
is valid as an iris anti-spoofing mechanism, but will
have little use in fake fingerprint detection.
This same reasoning can be applied to the vast ma-
jority of the liveness detection methods found in the
state-of-the-art. Although all of them represent very
valuable works which bring insight into the difficult
problem of spoofing detection, they fail to generalize
to different problems as they are usually designed to
work on one specific modality and, in many cases, also
to detect one specific type of spoofing attack.
 Human observers very often refer to the “different
appearance” of real and fake samples to distinguish
between them. As stated above, the different metrics
and methods designed for IQA intend to estimate in
an objective and reliable way the perceived appearance
of images by humans.
Moreover, as will be explained in Section III, differ-
ent quality measures present different sensitivity to image
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Table I and Section III.
artifacts and distortions. For instance, measures like the
mean squared error respond more to additive noise, whereas
others such as the spectral phase error are more sensitive
to blur; while gradient-related features react to distortions
concentrated around edges and textures. Therefore, using a
wide range of IQMs exploiting complementary image qual-
ity properties, should permit to detect the aforementioned
quality differences between real and fake samples expected
to be found in many attack attempts (i.e., providing the
method with multi-attack protection capabilities).
All these observations lead us to believe that there is
sound proof for the “quality-difference” hypothesis and
that image quality measures have the potential to achieve
success in biometric protection tasks.
III. THE SECURITY PROTECTION METHOD
The problem of fake biometric detection can be seen as
a two-class classification problem where an input biometric
sample has to be assigned to one of two classes: real or fake.
The key point of the process is to find a set of discriminant
features which permits to build an appropriate classifier
which gives the probability of the image “realism” given the
extracted set of features. In the present work we propose
a novel parameterization using 25 general image quality
measures.
A general diagram of the protection approach proposed
in this work is shown in Fig. 2. In order to keep its
generality and simplicity, the system needs only one input:
the biometric sample to be classified as real or fake (i.e., the
same image acquired for biometric recognition purposes).
Furthermore, as the method operates on the whole image
without searching for any trait-specific properties, it does
not require any preprocessing steps (e.g., fingerprint seg-
mentation, iris detection or face extraction) prior to the
computation of the IQ features. This characteristic mini-
mizes its computational load. Once the feature vector has
been generated the sample is classified as real (generated
by a genuine trait) or fake (synthetically produced), using
some simple classifiers. In particular, for our experiments
we have considered standard implementations in Matlab
of the Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and Quadratic
Discriminant Analysis (QDA) classifiers [44].
The parameterization proposed in the present work com-
prises 25 image quality measures both reference and blind
(as will be introduced in the next sections). As it would
be unfeasible to cover all the immense range of methods,
approaches and perspectives proposed in the literature for
IQA, the initial feature selection process to determine
the set of 25 IQMs has been carried out according to
four general criteria, which intend that the final method
complies to the highest possible extent with the desirable
requirements set for liveness detection systems (described
in Section I). These four selection criteria are:
 Performance. Only widely used image quality ap-
proaches which have been consistently tested showing
good performance for different applications have been
considered.
 Complementarity. In order to generate a system as
general as possible in terms of attacks detected and
biometric modalities supported, we have given priority
to IQMs based on complementary properties of the
image (e.g., sharpness, entropy or structure).
 Complexity. In order to keep the simplicity of the
method, low complexity features have been preferred
over those which require a high computational load.
 Speed. This is, in general, closely related to the previ-
ous criterium (complexity). To assure a user-friendly
non-intrusive application, users should not be kept
waiting for a response from the recognition system.
For this reason, big importance has been given to the
feature extraction time, which has a very big impact
in the overall speed of the fake detection algorithm.
The final 25 selected image quality measures are sum-
marized in Table I. Details about each of these 25 IQMs
are given in Sections III-A and III-B. For clarity, in Fig. 3
we show a diagram with the general IQM classification fol-
lowed in these sections. Acronyms of the different features
are highlighted in bold in the text and in Fig. 3.
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# Type Acronym Name Ref. Description
1 FR MSE Mean Squared Error [29] MSE(I; I^) = 1
NM
PN
i=1
PM
j=1(Ii;j   I^i;j)2
2 FR PSNR Peak Signal to Noise Ratio [30] PSNR(I; I^) = 10 log( max(I
2)
MSE(I;^I)
)
3 FR SNR Signal to Noise Ratio [31] SNR(I; I^) = 10 log(
PN
i=1
PM
j=1(Ii;j)
2
NMMSE(I;^I) )
4 FR SC Structural Content [32] SC(I; I^) =
PN
i=1
PM
j=1(Ii;j)
2PN
i=1
PM
j=1 (^Ii;j)
2
5 FR MD Maximum Difference [32] MD(I; I^) = max jIi;j   I^i;j j
6 FR AD Average Difference [32] AD(I; I^) = 1
NM
PN
i=1
PM
j=1(Ii;j   I^i;j)
7 FR NAE Normalized Absolute Error [32] NAE(I; I^) =
PN
i=1
PM
j=1 jIi;j I^i;j jPN
i=1
PM
j=1 jIi;j j
8 FR RAMD R-Averaged MD [29] RAMD(I; I^; R) = 1
R
PR
r=1maxr jIi;j   I^i;j j
9 FR LMSE Laplacian MSE [32] LMSE(I; I^) =
PN 1
i=1
PM 1
j=2 (h(Ii;j) h(^Ii;j))2PN 1
i=1
PM 1
j=2 h(Ii;j)
2
10 FR NXC Normalized Cross-Correlation [32] NXC(I; I^) =
PN
i=1
PM
j=1(Ii;j ^Ii;j)PN
i=1
PM
j=1(Ii;j)
2
11 FR MAS Mean Angle Similarity [29] MAS(I; I^) = 1  1
NM
PN
i=1
PM
j=1(i;j)
12 FR MAMS Mean Angle Magnitude Similarity [29] MAMS(I; I^) = 1
NM
PN
i=1
PM
j=1(1  [1  i;j ][1 
jjIi;j I^i;j jj
255
])
13 FR TED Total Edge Difference [33] TED(I; I^) = 1
NM
PN
i=1
PM
j=1 jIEi;j   I^Ei;j j
14 FR TCD Total Corner Difference [33] TCD(I; I^) = jNcr N^crj
max(Ncr;N^cr)
15 FR SME Spectral Magnitude Error [34] SME(I; I^) = 1
NM
PN
i=1
PM
j=1(jFi;j j   jF^i;j j)2
16 FR SPE Spectral Phase Error [34] SPE(I; I^) = 1
NM
PN
i=1
PM
j=1 j arg(Fi;j)  arg(F^i;j)j2
17 FR GME Gradient Magnitude Error [35] SME(I; I^) = 1
NM
PN
i=1
PM
j=1(jGi;j j   jG^i;j j)2
18 FR GPE Gradient Phase Error [35] SPE(I; I^) = 1
NM
PN
i=1
PM
j=1 j arg(Gi;j)  arg(G^i;j)j2
19 FR SSIM Structural Similarity Index [36] See [36] and practical implementation available in [37]
20 FR VIF Visual Information Fidelity [38] See [38] and practical implementation available in [37]
21 FR RRED Reduced Ref. Entropic Difference [39] See [39] and practical implementation available in [37]
22 NR JQI JPEG Quality Index [40] See [40] and practical implementation available in [37]
23 NR HLFI High-Low Frequency Index [41] SME(I) =
Pil
i=1
Pjl
j=1 jFi;j j 
PN
i=ih+1
PM
j=jh+1
jFi;j jPN
i=1
PM
j=1 jFi;j j
24 NR BIQI Blind Image Quality Index [42] See [42] and practical implementation available in [37]
25 NR NIQE Naturalness Image Quality Estimator [43] See [43] and practical implementation available in [37]
TABLE I
LIST OF THE 25 IMAGE QUALITY MEASURES (IQMS) IMPLEMENTED IN THE PRESENT WORK AND USED FOR BIOMETRIC PROTECTION. ALL THE
FEATURES WERE EITHER DIRECTLY TAKEN OR ADAPTED FROM THE REFERENCES GIVEN. IN THE TABLE: FR DENOTES FULL-REFERENCE AND
NR NO-REFERENCE; I DENOTES THE REFERENCE CLEAN IMAGE (OF SIZE N M ) AND I^ THE SMOOTHED VERSION OF THE REFERENCE IMAGE.
FOR OTHER NOTATION SPECIFICATIONS AND UNDEFINED VARIABLES OR FUNCTIONS WE REFER THE READER TO THE DESCRIPTION OF EACH
PARTICULAR FEATURE IN SECTION III. ALSO, FOR THOSE FEATURES WITH NO MATHEMATICAL DEFINITION, THE EXACT DETAILS ABOUT THEIR
COMPUTATION MAY BE FOUND IN THE GIVEN REFERENCES.
A. Full-Reference IQ measures
Full-reference (FR) IQA methods rely on the availability
of a clean undistorted reference image to estimate the
quality of the test sample. In the problem of fake detection
addressed in this work such a reference image is unknown,
as the detection system only has access to the input sample.
In order to circumvent this limitation, the same strategy
already successfully used for image manipulation detection
in [24] and for steganalysis in [26], is implemented here.
As shown in Fig. 2, the input grey-scale image I (of
size N M ) is filtered with a low-pass Gaussian kernel
( = 0:5 and size 3  3) in order to generate a smoothed
version I^. Then, the quality between both images (I and I^)
is computed according to the corresponding full-reference
IQA metric. This approach assumes that the loss of quality
produced by Gaussian filtering differs between real and fake
biometric samples. Assumption which is confirmed by the
experimental results given in Section IV.
1) FR-IQMs: Error Sensitivity Measures: Traditional
perceptual image quality assessment approaches are based
on measuring the errors (i.e., signal differences) between
the distorted and the reference images, and attempt to
quantify these errors in a way that simulates human visual
error sensitivity features.
Although their efficiency as signal fidelity measures is
somewhat controversial [45], [46], up to date, these are
probably the most widely used methods for IQA as they
conveniently make use of many known psychophysical
features of the human visual system [47], they are easy
to calculate and usually have very low computational com-
plexity.
Several of these metrics have been included in the 25-
feature parameterization proposed in the present work. For
clarity, these features have been classified here into five
different categories (see Fig. 3) according to the image
property measured [29]:
 Pixel Difference measures [32], [29]. These features
compute the distortion between two images on the
basis of their pixelwise differences. Here we include:
Mean Squared Error (MSE), Peak Signal to Noise
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Ratio (PSNR), Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR), Struc-
tural Content (SC), Maximum Difference (MD), Av-
erage Difference (AD), Normalized Absolute Error
(NAE), R-Averaged Maximum Difference (RAMD)
and Laplacian Mean Squared Error (LMSE). The
formal definitions for each of these features are given
in Table I.
In the RAMD entry in Table I, maxr is defined as the
r-highest pixel difference between two images. For the
present implementation, R = 10.
In the LMSE entry in Table I, h(Ii;j) = Ii+1;j +
Ii 1;j + Ii;j+1 + Ii;j 1   4Ii;j .
 Correlation-based measures [32], [29]. The similar-
ity between two digital images can also be quanti-
fied in terms of the correlation function. A variant
of correlation-based measures can be obtained by
considering the statistics of the angles between the
pixel vectors of the original and distorted images.
These features include (also defined in Table I): Nor-
malized Cross-Correlation (NXC), Mean Angle Sim-
ilarity (MAS) and Mean Angle-Magnitude Similarity
(MAMS).
In the MAS and MAMS entries in Table I, i;j
denotes the angle between two vectors, defined as,
i;j =
2
 arccos
hIi;j ;^Ii;ji
jjIi;j jjjj^Ii;j jj , where hIi;j ; I^i;ji denotes
the scalar product. As we are dealing with positive ma-
trices I and I^, we are constrained to the first quadrant
of the Cartesian space so that the maximum difference
attained will be =2, therefore the coefficient 2= is
included for normalization.
 Edge-based measures. Edges and other two-
dimensional features such as corners, are some of the
most informative parts of an image, which play a key
role in the human visual system and in many com-
puter vision algorithms including quality assessment
applications [33].
Since the structural distortion of an image is tightly
linked with its edge degradation, here we have con-
sidered two edge-related quality measures: Total Edge
Difference (TED) and Total Corner Difference (TCD).
In order to implement both features, which are com-
puted according to the corresponding expressions
given in Table I, we use: (i) the Sobel operator to
build the binary edge maps IE and I^E; (ii) the Harris
corner detector [48] to compute the number of corners
Ncr and N^cr found in I and I^.
 Spectral distance measures. The Fourier transform
is another traditional image processing tool which has
been applied to the field of image quality assessment
[29]. In this work we will consider as IQ spectral-
related features: the Spectral Magnitude Error (SME)
and the Spectral Phase Error (SPE), defined in Table I
(where F and F^ are the respective Fourier transforms
of I and I^), and arg(F) denotes phase.
 Gradient-based measures. Gradients convey impor-
tant visual information which can be of great use
for quality assessment. Many of the distortions that
can affect an image are reflected by a change in its
gradient. Therefore, using such information, structural
and contrast changes can be effectively captured [49].
Two simple gradient-based features are included in the
biometric protection system proposed in the present
article: Gradient Magnitude Error (GME) and Gradi-
ent Phase Error (GPE), defined in Table I (where G
and G^ are the gradient maps of I and I^ defined as
G = Gx + iGy, where Gx and Gy are the gradients
in the x and y directions).
2) FR-IQMs: Structural Similarity Measures: Although
being very convenient and widely used, the aforementioned
image quality metrics based on error sensitivity present
several problems which are evidenced by their mismatch (in
many cases) with subjective human-based quality scoring
systems [45]. In this scenario, a recent new paradigm for
image quality assessment based on structural similarity was
proposed following the hypothesis that the human visual
system is highly adapted for extracting structural informa-
tion from the viewing field [36]. Therefore, distortions in
an image that come from variations in lighting, such as
contrast or brightness changes (nonstructural distortions),
should be treated differently from structural ones.
Among these recent objective perceptual measures, the
Structural Similarity Index Measure (SSIM), has the sim-
plest formulation and has gained widespread popularity in a
broad range of practical applications [36], [50]. In view of
its very attractive properties, the SSIM has been included
in the 25-feature parameterization.
3) FR-IQMs: Information Theoretic Measures: The
quality assessment problem may also be understood, from
an information theory perspective, as an information-
fidelity problem (rather than a signal-fidelity problem). The
core idea behind these approaches is that an image source
communicates to a receiver through a channel that limits the
amount of information that could flow through it, thereby
introducing distortions. The goal is to relate the visual
quality of the test image to the amount of information
shared between the test and the reference signals, or more
precisely, the mutual information between them. Under
this general framework, image quality measures based on
information fidelity exploit the (in some cases imprecise)
relationship between statistical image information and vi-
sual quality.
In the present work we consider two of these
information-theoretic features: the Visual Information Fi-
delity (VIF) [38] and the Reduced Reference Entropic
Difference index (RRED) [39]. Both metrics are based on
the information theoretic perspective of IQA but each of
them take either a global or a local approximation to the
problem, as is explained below.
The VIF metric measures the quality fidelity as the
ratio between the total information (measured in terms of
entropy) ideally extracted by the brain from the whole
distorted image and the total information conveyed within
the complete reference image. This metric relies on the
assumption that natural images of perfect quality, in the
absence of any distortions, pass through the human visual
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system (HVS) of an observer before entering the brain,
which extracts cognitive information from it. For distorted
images, it is hypothesized that the reference signal has
passed through another “distortion channel” before entering
the HVS. The VIF measure is derived from the ratio of
two mutual information quantities: the mutual information
between the input and the output of the HVS channel
when no distortion channel is present (i.e., reference image
information) and the mutual information between the input
of the distortion channel and the output of the HVS channel
for the test image. Therefore, to compute the VIF metric,
the entire reference image is required as quality is assessed
on a global basis.
On the other hand, the RRED metric approaches the
problem of QA from the perspective of measuring the
amount of local information difference between the refer-
ence image and the projection of the distorted image onto
the space of natural images, for a given subband of the
wavelet domain. In essence, the RRED algorithm computes
the average difference between scaled local entropies of
wavelet coefficients of reference and projected distorted
images in a distributed fashion. This way, contrary to the
VIF feature, for the RRED it is not necessary to have access
the entire reference image but only to a reduced part of its
information (i.e., quality is computed locally). This required
information can even be reduced to only one single scalar
in case all the scaled entropy terms in the selected wavelet
subband are considered in one single block.
B. No-Reference IQ measures
Unlike the objective reference IQA methods, in general
the human visual system does not require of a reference
sample to determine the quality level of an image. Fol-
lowing this same principle, automatic no-reference image
quality assessment (NR-IQA) algorithms try to handle the
very complex and challenging problem of assessing the
visual quality of images, in the absence of a reference.
Presently, NR-IQA methods generally estimate the quality
of the test image according to some pre-trained statistical
models. Depending on the images used to train this model
and on the a priori knowledge required, the methods are
coarsely divided into one of three trends [51]:
 Distortion-specific approaches. These techniques
rely on previously acquired knowledge about the type
of visual quality loss caused by a specific distortion.
The final quality measure is computed according to a
model trained on clean images and on images affected
by this particular distortion. Two of these measures
have been included in the biometric protection method
proposed in the present work.
The JPEG Quality Index (JQI), which evaluates the
quality in images affected by the usual block artifacts
found in many compression algorithms running at low
bit rates such as the JPEG [40].
The High-Low Frequency Index (HLFI), which is
formally defined in Table I. It was inspired by previous
work which considered local gradients as a blind
metric to detect blur and noise [41]. Similarly, the
HLFI feature is sensitive to the sharpness of the
image by computing the difference between the power
in the lower and upper frequencies of the Fourier
Spectrum. In the HLFI entry in Table I, il, ih, jl, jh are
respectively the indices corresponding to the lower and
upper frequency thresholds considered by the method.
In the current implementation, il = ih = 0:15N and
jl = jh = 0:15M .
 Training-based approaches. Similarly to the previous
class of NR-IQA methods, in this type of techniques
a model is trained using clean and distorted images.
Then, the quality score is computed based on a number
of features extracted from the test image and related
to the general model [42]. However, unlike the former
approaches, these metrics intend to provide a general
quality score not related to a specific distortion. To
this end, the statistical model is trained with images
affected by different types of distortions.
This is the case of the Blind Image Quality Index
(BIQI) described in [42], which is part of the 25 fea-
ture set used in the present work. The BIQI follows a
two-stage framework in which the individual measures
of different distortion-specific experts are combined to
generate one global quality score.
 Natural Scene Statistic approaches. These blind IQA
techniques use a priori knowledge taken from natural
scene distortion-free images to train the initial model
(i.e., no distorted images are used). The rationale be-
hind this trend relies on the hypothesis that undistorted
images of the natural world present certain regular
properties which fall within a certain subspace of all
possible images. If quantified appropriately, deviations
from the regularity of natural statistics can help to
evaluate the perceptual quality of an image [43].
This approach is followed by the Natural Image
Quality Evaluator (NIQE) used in the present work
[43]. The NIQE is a completely blind image quality
analyzer based on the construction of a quality aware
collection of statistical features (derived from a corpus
of natural undistorted images) related to a multi variate
Gaussian natural scene statistical model.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
The evaluation experimental protocol has been designed
with a two-fold objective:
 First, evaluate the “multi-biometric” dimension of the
protection method. That is, its ability to achieve a
good performance, compared to other trait-specific
approaches, under different biometric modalities. For
this purpose three of the most extended image-based
biometric modalities have been considered in the ex-
periments: iris, fingerprints and 2-D face.
 Second, evaluate the “multi-attack” dimension of the
protection method. That is, its ability to detect not
only spoofing attacks (such as other liveness detection-
specific approaches) but also fraudulent access at-
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REAL
Iris-Spoofing Attack: ATVS-Fir DB 
  
FAKE
   
 
Fig. 4. Typical real iris images (top row) and their correspond-
ing fake samples (bottom row) that may be found in the ATVS-FIr
DB used in the iris-spoofing experiments. The database is available at
http://atvs.ii.uam.es/.
tempts carried out with synthetic or reconstructed
samples (see Fig. 1).
With these goals in mind, and in order to achieve
reproducible results, we have only used in the experimental
validation publicly available databases with well described
evaluation protocols. This has allowed us to compare, in
an objective and fair way, the performance of the proposed
system with other existing state-of-the-art liveness detection
solutions.
The task in all the scenarios and experiments described
in the next sections is to automatically distinguish between
real and fake samples. As explained in Section III, for this
purpose we build a 25-dimensional simple classifier based
on general IQMs (see Fig. 2). Therefore, in all cases, results
are reported in terms of: the False Genuine Rate (FGR),
which accounts for the number of false samples that were
classified as real; and the False Fake Rate (FFR), which
gives the probability of an image coming from a genuine
sample being considered as fake. The Half Total Error Rate
(HTER) is computed as HTER = (FGR+ FFR)=2.
A. Results: Iris
For the iris modality the protection method is tested
under two different attack scenarios, namely: i) spoofing
attack and ii) attack with synthetic samples.
For each of the scenarios a specific pair of real-fake
databases is used. Databases are divided into totally in-
dependent (in terms of users): train set, used to train the
classifier; and test set, used to evaluate the performance of
the proposed protection method.
In all cases the final results (shown in Table II) are
obtained applying two-fold cross validation.
The classifier used for the two scenarios is based on
Quadratic Discriminant Analysis (QDA) [44] as it showed
a slightly better performance than Linear Discriminant
Analysis (LDA), which will be used in the face-related
experiments, while keeping the simplicity of the whole
system.
1) Results: Iris-Spoofing: The database used in this
spoofing scenario is the ATVS-FIr DB which may be
obtained from the Biometric Recognition Group-ATVS1.
1http://atvs.ii.uam.es/
REAL
Iris-Synthetic Attack
 
CASIA-IrisV1
  
FAKE
 
WVU-Synthetic Iris
  
 
Fig. 5. Typical real iris images from CASIA-IrisV1 (top row)
and fake samples from WVU-Synthetic Iris DB (bottom row), used
in the iris-synthetic experiments. The databases are available at
http://biometrics.idealtest.org and http://www.citer.wvu.edu/.
Results: Iris
FFR FGR HTER Av. Exec. (s)
Iris-Spoof. 4.2 0.25 2.2 0.238
Iris-Spoof. [28] 1.3 4.9 3.1 2.563
Iris-Synthetic 3.4 0.8 2.1 0.156
TABLE II
RESULTS (IN PERCENTAGE) OBTAINED BY THE PROPOSED BIOMETRIC
PROTECTION METHOD BASED ON IQA FOR THE TWO ATTACKING
SCENARIOS CONSIDERED IN THE IRIS MODALITY: SPOOFING (TOP
ROW) AND SYNTHETIC (BOTTOM ROW). FOR COMPARISON, THE
MIDDLE ROW REPORTS THE RESULTS OBTAINED BY A
SELF-IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANTI-SPOOFING METHOD PRESENTED
IN [28]. THE LAST COLUMN INDICATES, IN SECONDS, THE AVERAGE
EXECUTION TIME TO PROCESS EACH SAMPLE.
The database comprises real and fake iris images (printed
on paper) of 50 users randomly selected from the BioSec
baseline corpus [52]. It follows the same structure as the
original BioSec dataset, therefore, it comprises 50 users  2
eyes  4 images  2 sessions = 800 fake iris images and its
corresponding original samples. The acquisition of both real
and fake samples was carried out using the LG IrisAccess
EOU3000 sensor with infrared illumination which captures
bmp grey-scale images of size 640 480 pixels.
In Fig. 4 we show some typical real and fake iris images
that may be found in the dataset.
As mentioned above, for the experiments the database is
divided into a: train set, comprising 400 real images and
their corresponding fake samples of 50 eyes; and a test set
with the remaining 400 real and fake samples coming from
the other 50 eyes available in the dataset.
The liveness detection results achieved by the proposed
approach under this scenario appear in the first row of
Table II, where we can see that the method is able to cor-
rectly classify over 97% of the samples. In the last column
we show the average execution time in seconds needed to
process (extract the features and classify) each sample of
the two considered databases. This time was measured on
a standard 64-bit Windows7-PC with a 3.4 GHz processor
and 16 GB RAM memory, running MATLAB R2012b.
As no other iris liveness detection method has yet been
reported on the public ATVS-FIr DB, for comparison, the
second row of Table II reports the results obtained on
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this database by a self-implementation of the anti-spoofing
method proposed in [28]. It may be observed that the
proposed method not only outperforms the state-of-the-art
technique, but also, as it does not require any iris detection
or segmentation, the processing time is around 10 times
faster.
2) Results: Iris-Synthetic: In this scenario attacks are
performed with synthetically generated iris samples which
are injected in the communication channel between the
sensor and the feature extraction module (see Fig. 1). The
real and fake databases used in this case are:
 Real database: CASIA-IrisV1. This dataset is publicly
available through the Biometric Ideal Test (BIT) plat-
form of the Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute
of Automation (CASIA)2. It contains 7 grey-scale
320  280 images of 108 eyes captured in two sep-
arate sessions with a self-developed CASIA close-up
camera and are stored in bmp format.
 Synthetic database: WVU-Synthetic Iris DB [23]. Be-
ing a database that contains only fully synthetic data, it
is not subjected to any legal constraints and is publicly
available through the CITeR research center3.
The synthetic irises are generated following the
method described in [23], which has two stages. In
the first stage, a Markov Random Field model trained
on the CASIA-IrisV1 DB is used to generate a back-
ground texture representing the global iris appearance.
In the next stage, a variety of iris features such as
radial and concentric furrows, collarette and crypts, are
generated and embedded in the texture field. Following
the CASIA-IrisV1 DB, this synthetic database includes
7 grey-scale 320 280 bmp images of 1,000 different
subjects (eyes).
In Fig. 5 we show some typical real and fake iris images
that may be found in the CASIA-IrisV1 DB and in the
WVU-Synthetic Iris DB. It may be observe that, as a
consequence of the training process carried out on the
CASIA-IrisV1 DB, the synthetic samples are visually very
similar to those of the real dataset, which makes them
specially suitable for the considered attacking scenario.
The last column indicates, in seconds, the average exe-
cution time to process each sample.
In the experiments, in order to have balanced training
classes (real and fake) only 54 synthetic eyes (out of the
possible 1,000) were randomly selected. This way, the
problem of overfitting one class over the other is avoided.
The test set comprises the remaining 54 real eyes and 946
synthetic samples.
The results achieved by the proposed protection method
based on IQA on this attacking scenario are shown in the
bottom row of Table II. In spite of the similarity of real
and fake images, the global error of the algorithm in this
scenario is 2.1%.
The experiments reported in this Section IV-A show
the ability of the approach to adapt to different attacking
2http://biometrics.idealtest.org
3http://www.citer.wvu.edu/
LivDet 2009 DB
BIOMETRIKA  
FX2000
(FLAT OPTICAL)
CROSSMATCH
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(FLAT OPTICAL)
IDENTIX 
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(FLAT OPTICAL)
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Silicone Playdoh Gelatin
Fig. 6. Typical examples of real and fake fingerprint images
that can be found in the public LivDet09 database used in the
fingerprint anti-spoofing experiments. The database is available at
http://prag.diee.unica.it/LivDet09/.
scenarios and to keep a high level of protection in all of
them. Therefore, the results presented in Table II confirm
the “multi-attack” dimension of the proposed method.
B. Results: Fingerprints
For the fingerprint modality, the performance of the pro-
posed protection method is evaluated using the LivDet 2009
DB [10] comprising over 18,000 real and fake samples.
As in the iris experiments, the database is divided into
a: train set, used to train the classifier; and test set, used
to evaluate the performance of the protection method. In
order to generate totally unbiased results, there is no overlap
between both sets (i.e., samples corresponding to each user
are just included in the train or the test set).
The same QDA classifier already considered in the iris-
related experiments is used here.
1) Results: Fingerprints-Spoofing LivDet: The LivDet
2009 DB [10] was captured in the framework of the
2009 Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition and it is
distributed through the site of the competition4. It comprises
three datasets of real and fake fingerprints captured each
of them with a different flat optical sensor: i) Biometrika
FX2000 (569 dpi), ii) CrossMatch Verifier 300CL (500
dpi), and iii) Identix DFR2100 (686dpi). The gummy
fingers were generated using three different materials: sili-
cone, gelatine and playdoh, always following a consensual
procedure (with the cooperation of the user). As a whole,
the database contains over 18,000 samples coming from
more than 100 different fingers.
Some typical examples of the images that can be found in
this database are shown in Fig. 6, where the material used
for the generation of the fake fingers is specified (silicone,
gelatine or playdoh).
The train and test sets selected for the evaluation exper-
iments on this database are the same as the ones used in
4http://prag.diee.unica.it/LivDet09/
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Comparative Results: Fingerprints-LivDet09
Biometrika CrossMatch Identix
FFR FGR HTER FFR FGR HTER FFR FGR HTER
IQA-based 14.0 11.6 12.8 8.6 12.8 10.7 1.1 1.4 1.2
Best LivDet09 [10] 15.6 20.7 18.2 7.4 11.4 9.4 2.7 2.8 2.8
Marasco et al. [53] 12.2 13.0 12.6 17.4 12.9 15.2 8.3 11.0 9.7
Moon et al. [54] reported in [53] 20.8 25.0 23.0 27.4 19.6 23.5 74.7 1.6 38.2
Nikam et al. [55] reported in [53] 14.3 42.3 28.3 19.0 18.4 18.7 23.7 37.0 30.3
Abhyankar et al. [56] reported in [53] 24.2 39.2 31.7 39.7 23.3 31.5 48.4 46.0 47.2
Av. Exec. (s) 0.169 0.231 0.368
TABLE III
RESULTS (IN PERCENTAGE) OBTAINED IN THE LIVDET 2009 DB BY: THE PROPOSED BIOMETRIC PROTECTION METHOD (IQA-BASED, TOP ROW);
EACH OF THE BEST APPROACHES PARTICIPATING IN LIVDET 2009 [10] (SECOND ROW); THE METHOD PROPOSED IN [53] WHICH COMBINES
PERSPIRATION AND MORPHOLOGICAL FEATURES (THIRD ROW); THE METHOD PROPOSED IN [54] BASED ON THE WAVELET ANALYSIS OF THE
FINGER TIP TEXTURE, ACCORDING TO AN IMPLEMENTATION FROM [53] (FOURTH ROW); THE METHOD PROPOSED IN [55] BASED ON THE
CURVELET ANALYSIS OF THE FINGER TIP TEXTURE, ACCORDING TO AN IMPLEMENTATION FROM [53] (FOURTH ROW); THE METHOD PROPOSED
IN [56] BASED ON THE COMBINATION OF LOCAL RIDGE FREQUENCIES AND MULTIRESOLUTION TEXTURE ANALYSIS, ACCORDING TO AN
IMPLEMENTATION FROM [53] (FIFTH ROW). THE BEST PERFORMANCE REPORTED ON EACH OF THE DATASETS IS HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD. THE
BOTTOM ROW SHOWS, IN SECONDS, THE AVERAGE EXECUTION TIME OF THE PROPOSED METHOD TO PROCESS EACH SAMPLE OF THE THREE
DATASETS.
LivDet 2009 DB
Train (Real/Fake) Test (Real/Fake)
# Fingers # Samples # Fingers # Samples
Biometrika 13/13 520/520s 39/13 1473/1480s
CrossMatch 35/35 1000/1000 (344g+346p+310s) 100/35 3000/3000 (1036g+1034p+930s)
Identix 63/35 750/750 (250g+250p+250s) 100/35 2250/2250 (750g+750p+750s)
TABLE IV
GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE LIVDET 2009 DB. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FAKE SAMPLES IS GIVEN IN TERMS OF THE MATERIALS USED FOR
THEIR GENERATION: g STANDS FOR GELATIN, p FOR PLAYDOH AND s FOR SILICONE.
the LivDet 2009 competition, so that the results obtained
by the proposed method based on general IQA may be
directly compared to the participants of the contest. The
general distribution of the database in the train and test
sets is specified in Table IV.
Results achieved on this database are shown in the first
two rows of Table III. For clarity, only the best results
achieved on LivDet09 for each of the individual datasets
is given (second row). The best performance obtained by
any of the reported methods on each of the three datasets
is highlighted in bold in order to facilitate the comparison
of the results.
In [53], a novel fingerprint liveness detection method
combining perspiration and morphological features was
presented and evaluated on the LivDet09 database fol-
lowing the same protocol (training and test sets) used in
the competition. In that work, comparative results were
reported with particular implementations (from the authors)
of the techniques proposed in: [54], based on the wavelet
analysis of the finger tip texture; [55], based on the curvelet
analysis of the finger tip texture; and [56] based on the
combination of local ridge frequencies and multiresolution
texture analysis. In the rows 3-7 of Table III we also
present these results so that they may be compared with
our proposed IQA-based method (row one). In the bottom
row we show the average execution time in seconds needed
to process (extract the features and classify) each sample
of the three datasets. This time was measured on a standard
64-bit Windows7-PC with a 3.4 GHz processor and 16
GB RAM memory, running MATLAB R2012b. Due to the
high simplicity of the method, the computational cost of
processing an image depends almost exclusively on the size
of the sample.
The results given in Table III show that our method
outperforms all the contestants in LivDet 2009 in two of the
datasets (Biometrika and Identix), while its classification
error is just slightly worse than the best of the participants
for the Crossmatch data. The classification error rates of
our approach are also clearly lower than those reported in
[53] for the different liveness detection solutions tested.
The results obtained in the fingerprint-based comparative
experiments strengthen the first observations made in Sec-
tion IV-A about the generality of the method, which is not
only capable of adapting to different biometric modalities
and attacks, but it also performs better than well known
methods from the state-of-the-art.
C. Results: 2D Face
The performance of the IQA-based protection method
has also been assessed on a face spoofing database: the
REPLAY-ATTACK DB [57] which is publicly available
from the IDIAP Research Institute5.
The database contains short videos (around 10 seconds
in mov format) of both real-access and spoofing attack
attempts of 50 different subjects, acquired with a 320240
resolution webcam of a 13-inch MacBook Laptop. The
5https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/replayattack
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Results: Face Replay-Attack DB
Print Mobile Highdef Grandtest
FFR FGR HTER FFR FGR HTER FFR FGR HTER FFR FGR HTER
Hand 13.6 5.0 9.3 1.9 3.7 2.8 15.6 10.5 13.1 19.6 11.3 15.4
Fixed 11.5 5.3 8.4 2.8 4.1 3.5 8.4 9.9 9.1 13.7 11.7 12.7
All 11.6 4.1 7.9 2.4 3.9 3.2 14.0 10.2 12.1 17.9 12.5 15.2
Av. Exec. (s) 0.148 0.150 0.147
TABLE V
RESULTS (IN PERCENTAGE) OBTAINED ON THE REPLAY-ATTACK DB BY THE PROPOSED BIOMETRIC PROTECTION METHOD FOR THE
DIFFERENT SCENARIOS CONSIDERED IN THE DATASET AND FOLLOWING THE ASSOCIATED EVALUATION PROTOCOL. THE BOTTOM ROW SHOWS,
IN SECONDS, THE AVERAGE EXECUTION TIME OF THE PROPOSED METHOD TO PROCESS EACH SAMPLE OF THE THREE DATASETS (THE
GRANDTEST DATASET IS A COMBINATION OF THE THREE PREVIOUS ONES AS EXPLAINED IN SECT. IV-C).
Controlled scenario
Face Spoofing Attack: REPLAY-ATTACK DB
Adverse scenario
REAL
FAKE
(PRINT)
FAKE
(MOBILE)
FAKE
(HIGHDEF)
Fig. 7. Typical examples of real and fake (print, mobile and highdef)
face images that can be found in the public REPLAY-ATTACK DB used
in the face anti-spoofing experiments. Images were extracted from videos
acquired in the two considered scenarios: controlled and adverse. The
database is available at https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/replayattack.
recordings were carried out under two different conditions:
i) controlled, with a uniform background and artificial
lighting; and ii) adverse, with natural illumination and non-
uniform background.
Three different types of attacks were considered: i) print,
illegal access attempts are carried out with hard copies of
high-resolution digital photographs of the genuine users; ii)
mobile, the attacks are performed using photos and videos
taken with the iPhone using the iPhone screen; iii) highdef,
similar to the mobile subset but in this case the photos and
videos are displayed using an iPad screen with resolution
1024 768.
REPLAY-ATTACK DB
# Videos per subset (hand/fixed)
Train Development Test
Real-Accesses 60 60 80
Print-Attacks 60 (30/30) 60 (30/30) 80 (40/40)
Mobile-attacks 120 (60/60) 120 (60/60) 160 (80/80)
Highdef-attacks 120 (60/60) 120 (60/60) 160 (80/80)
TABLE VI
STRUCTURE OF THE EVALUATION PROTOCOLS RELEASED WITH THE
REPLAY-ATTACK DB. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FAKE VIDEOS IS
GIVEN IN TERMS OF THE PROCEDURE USED FOR THEIR ACQUISITION:
HAND-HELD OR FIXED SUPPORT.
In addition, access attempts in the three attack subsets
(print, mobile and highdef) were recorded in two different
modes depending on the strategy followed to hold the attack
replay device (paper, mobile phone or tablet): i) hand-based
and ii) fixed-support.
Such a variety of real and fake acquisition scenarios
and conditions makes the REPLAY-ATTACK DB a unique
benchmark for testing anti-spoofing techniques for face-
based systems. As a consequence, the print subset was
selected as the evaluation dataset in the 2011 Competition
on Counter Measures to 2-D Facial Spoofing Attacks [11].
Some typical images (frames extracted from the videos)
from real and fake (print, mobile and highdef) access
attempts that may be found in the REPLAY-ATTACK DB
are shown in Fig. 7.
The database has a perfectly defined associated evalu-
ation protocol which considers three totally independent
datasets (in terms of users): train, used to tune the pa-
rameters of the method; development, to fix the decision
threshold; and test, where final results are computed. The
protocol is released with the database and has been strictly
followed in the present experiments. The general structure
of the protocol is specified in Table VI.
The database is also released with face detection data.
These data was used to crop and normalize all the faces
to a 64  64 bounding box prior to the anti-spoofing
experiments. This way the final classification results are
ensured to be totally unbiased and not dependent on
contextual-specific artifacts such as: unwanted changes in
the background; different sizes of the heads (we can see
in Fig. 7 that fake faces are in general slightly bigger than
the ones in real images); a black frame due to an imperfect
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Comparative: REP.-ATT. DB (grandtest)
FFR FGR HTER
IQA-based 17.9 12.5 15.2
LBP-based [57] - - 15.2
LBP-based [57], [58] - - 13.9
TABLE VII
COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS (IN PERCENTAGE) OBTAINED BY THE
IQA-BASED PROTECTION METHOD PROPOSED IN THE PRESENT WORK,
AND THE LBP-BASED ANTI-SPOOFING TECHNIQUES DESCRIBED IN
[57] (PARTIALLY BASED ON THE RESULTS REPORTED ON [58]).
RESULTS ARE OBTAINED FOLLOWING THE GRANDTEST-ALL SUPPORTS
PROTOCOL OF THE REPLAY-ATTACK DB.
fitting of the attack media on the capturing device screen,
etc.
As the proposed IQA-based method is a single-image
technique (i.e., it just needs one input image and not
a sequence of them), each frame of the videos in the
REPLAY-ATTACK DB has been considered as an inde-
pendent sample. Therefore, classification (real or fake) is
done on a frame-by-frame basis and not per video.
In Table V we show the results obtained on the test
set by the proposed method using in this case a standard
classifier based on Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), as
for the face problem it showed slightly better performance
than the QDA classifier used in the previous two cases (iris
and fingerprints). In the bottom row we show the average
execution time in seconds needed to process (extract the
features and classify) each sample of the three datasets
(print, mobile and highdef, as the grandtest scenario is a
combination of the previous three as is explained below).
As in the iris and fingerprint experiments, this time was
measured on a standard 64-bit Windows7-PC with a 3.4
GHz processor and 16 GB RAM memory, running MAT-
LAB R2012b. Recall that the print, mobile and highdef
scenarios refer to the type of artifact being used as forgery
and not to the acquisition device, which is de same for
all cases (320 240 resolution webcam of a 13-inch Mac-
Book Laptop). Therefore, as expected, the sample average
processing time in all the datasets is almost identical.
In the grandtest experiments (also defined in the associ-
ated protocol) the protection method is trained using data
from the print, mobile and highdef scenarios, and tested
also on samples from the three type of attacks. This is
probably the most realistic attack case, as, in general, we
cannot know a priori the type of artifact (paper, mobile
phone or tablet) that the attacker will use to try to break
into the system.
Results in Table V are also presented in terms of the
type of strategy followed to hold the attack replay device:
hand-based, fixed-support or all (where data of the previous
two types is used).
The performance shown by the proposed algorithm in
the face-based evaluation confirm the conclusions extracted
from the iris and fingerprint experiments: the IQA-based
protection method is able to adapt to different modalities,
databases and attacks performing consistently well in all of
them.
Comparative: REP.-ATT. DB (print)
FFR FGR HTER
IQA-based 0.0 1.0 0.5
AMILAB (motion) [11] 0.0 1.2 0.6
CASIA (motion) [11] 0.0 0.0 0.0
IDIAP [11] 0.0 0.0 0.0
SIANI (motion) [11] 0.0 21.2 10.6
UNICAMP (motion) [11] 1.2 0.0 0.6
UOULU [11] 0.0 0.0 0.0
TABLE VIII
COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS (IN PERCENTAGE) OBTAINED BY THE
IQA-BASED PROTECTION METHOD, AND THE DIFFERENT
PARTICIPANTS IN THE 1ST COMPETITION ON COUNTER MEASURES TO
2-D FACIAL SPOOFING ATTACKS 2011 [11]. RESULTS ARE OBTAINED
ON THE PRINT SUBCORPUS OF THE REPLAY-ATTACK DB. Motion
INDICATES THAT THE SYSTEM NEEDS TEMPORAL INFORMATION TO
DETECT FAKES.
In [57] different LBP-based anti-spoofing techniques
(partially based on the study presented in [58]) were tested
following the exact same protocol used in the present
work. Results were only reported on the grandtest sce-
nario considering all types of supports (hand and fixed).
A comparison between both protection approaches (IQA-
based and LBP-based) appears in Table VII. The error rates
of all methods are very similar, however, the IQA-based has
the advantage of its simplicity and generality.
In the 2011 Competition on Counter Measures to 2-
D Facial Spoofing Attacks 2011 [11] there were several
important differences with the protocol followed in the
present work: i) only the print subset was used (considering
both hand and fixed supports); ii) faces were not necessarily
cropped and normalized (which, as mentioned before, may
lead to optimistically biased results); and iii) classification
was carried out on a video-basis and not frame-by-frame
as in our experiments (i.e., systems in the competition
exploited both spatial and temporal information). Therefore,
a fully fair comparison between the competition and the
present work is not possible.
However, for reference, in Table VIII we present the
results obtained by the different participants in the compe-
tition compared to the performance of our method without
doing the cropping and normalization of the videos. We can
observe that, even though many of the contestants were
using a sequence of frames to classify each video (with
the complexity and speed decrease that this entails), our
proposed IQA-based method performs similarly to the top
ranked systems.
Furthermore, several of the algorithms presented to the
competition are based on motion-detection of the face and,
therefore, their ability to detect fake access attempts carried
out with replayed motion videos (mobile and highdef
scenarios) would be at least under question.
It should also be noted that in many applications there
is no access to a video of the user (i.e., no temporal
information is available). For these scenarios, many of
the anti-spoofing solutions presented at the competition
(marked with motion in Table VIII) would not be usable as
they are not designed to work on a single static face image.
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Best feature subsets - ATVS-FIr DB
Full Reference No Reference HTER
Best-5 MSE, PSNR, NAE, SME BIQI 51.4
Best-10 MSE, PSNR, SC, NXC, SNR, SME, GPE BIQI, NIQE, HLFI 47.5
Best-15 MSE, PSNR, SC, NXC, LMSE, NAE, SNR, SME, SPE, TCD, GPE, VIF BIQI, NIQE, HLFI 34.1
Best-overall All All 2.2
TABLE IX
BEST PERFORMING FEATURE SUBSETS OF DIMENSIONS 5, 10, 15 AND BEST-OVERALL, FOUND USING THE SFFS ALGORITHM ACCORDING TO
THE HTER ON THE TEST SET OF THE ATVS-FIR DB.
Best feature subsets - LivDet09 DB (Biometrika)
Full Reference No Reference HTER
Best-5 SPE, TCD, GPE BIQI, JQI 54.7
Best-10 PSNR, AD, SPE, TED, TCD, GPE, RRED BIQI, JQI, NIQE 45.1
Best-15 PSNR, AD, MD, RAMD, SPE, TED, TCD, GPE, SSIM, VIF, RRED BIQI, JQI, NIQE, HLFI 31.7
Best-overall All All 12.8
TABLE X
BEST PERFORMING FEATURE SUBSETS OF DIMENSIONS 5, 10, 15 AND BEST-OVERALL, FOUND USING THE SFFS ALGORITHM ACCORDING TO
THE HTER ON THE TEST SET OF THE LIVDET09 DB ACQUIRED WITH THE BIOMETRIKA SENSOR.
Best feature subsets - REPLAY-ATTACK DB (grandtest)
Full Reference No Reference HTER
Best-5 NXC, RAMD, MAS, SPE, RRED 53.5
Best-10 MSE, AD, SC, NXC, MD, RAMD, MAS, SME, SPE 48.9
Best-15 MSE, PSNR, AD, SC, NXC, MD, SNR, RAMD, MAMS, SME, SPE, TCD, GME, VIF NIQE 38.3
Best-overall All All 15.2
TABLE XI
BEST PERFORMING FEATURE SUBSETS OF DIMENSIONS 5, 10, 15 AND BEST-OVERALL, FOUND USING THE SFFS ALGORITHM ACCORDING TO
THE HTER ON THE TEST SET OF THE REPLAY-ATTACK DB FOR THE GRANDTEST PROTOCOL.
D. Preliminary Feature Individuality Analysis
In this section we present a preliminary study of the
discriminative power of the different quality features used
in the proposed protection method. Although a deeper
analysis of the features relevance for each of the considered
experimental scenarios would be advisable, such a rigorous
examination would represent on its own the topic for a new
research work which falls out of the scope of the present
contribution.
The Sequential Forward Floating Selection (SFFS) al-
gorithm has been used to determine if certain individual
features, or certain subsets of features, present a higher
discrimination capability than others under the biometric
security experimental framework considered in the work.
The SFFS method is a deterministic, single-solution feature
selection algorithm first proposed in [59], which has shown
remarkable performance over other suboptimal selection
schemes [60].
In the current experimental analysis, the selection cri-
terion to be optimized by the SFFS algorithm is the
HTER achieved by the system in the test set following the
experimental protocols described in Sects. IV-A, IV-B and
IV-C (the classifiers are the same ones used in the previous
experimental sections of the work). In particular, the SFFS
algorithm has been used to search for the best performing
feature subsets of dimensions: 5, 10, 15 and the best overall
subset regardless of its size.
For the sake of argument, the results obtained for three
representative scenarios of those considered in the previous
sections are given in Tables IX, X and XI. Several obser-
vations may be extracted from these results:
 The most remarkable finding is that the whole group
of 25 quality measures is consistently selected as
the best performing feature set for all the considered
scenarios and traits, showing the high complementarity
of the proposed metrics for the biometric security task
studied in the work.
 The first observation implies that other quality-related
features could still be added to the proposed set in
order to further improve its overall performance (until,
eventually, adding new features starts decreasing its
detection rates).
 For all cases, the best performing 5-feature and even
10-feature subsets present around a 50% HTER, which
reinforces the idea that the competitive performance
of the system does not rely on the high discriminative
power of certain specific features but on the diversity
and complementarity of the whole set.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The study of the vulnerabilities of biometric systems
against different types of attacks has been a very active
field of research in recent years [1]. This interest has
lead to big advances in the field of security-enhancing
technologies for biometric-based applications. However,
in spite of this noticeable improvement, the development
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of efficient protection methods against known threats has
proven to be a challenging task.
Simple visual inspection of an image of a real biometric
trait and a fake sample of the same trait shows that the two
images can be very similar and even the human eye may
find it difficult to make a distinction between them after
a short inspection. Yet, some disparities between the real
and fake images may become evident once the images are
translated into a proper feature space. These differences
come from the fact that biometric traits, as 3-D objects,
have their own optical qualities (absorption, reflection,
scattering, refraction), which other materials (paper, gelatin,
electronic display) or synthetically produced samples do
not possess. Furthermore, biometric sensors are designed
to provide good quality samples when they interact, in a
normal operation environment, with a real 3-D trait. If this
scenario is changed, or if the trait presented to the scanner
is an unexpected fake artifact (2-D, different material, etc.),
the characteristics of the captured image may significantly
vary.
In this context, it is reasonable to assume that the
image quality properties of real accesses and fraudulent
attacks will be different. Following this “quality-difference”
hypothesis, in the present research work we have explored
the potential of general image quality assessment as a
protection tool against different biometric attacks (with
special attention to spoofing).
For this purpose we have considered a feature space of
25 complementary image quality measures which we have
combined with simple classifiers to detect real and fake
access attempts. The novel protection method has been
evaluated on three largely deployed biometric modalities
such as the iris, the fingerprint and 2-D face, using publicly
available databases with well defined associated protocols.
This way, the results are reproducible and may be fairly
compared with other future analogue solutions.
Several conclusions may be extracted from the evaluation
results presented in the experimental sections of the article:
i) The proposed method is able to consistently perform at a
high level for different biometric traits (“multi-biometric”);
ii) The proposed method is able to adapt to different
types of attacks providing for all of them a high level
of protection (“multi-attack”); iii) The proposed method
is able to generalize well to different databases, acquisition
conditions and attack scenarios; iv) The error rates achieved
by the proposed protection scheme are in many cases
lower than those reported by other trait-specific state-of-
the-art anti-spoofing systems which have been tested in
the framework of different independent competitions; and
v) in addition to its very competitive performance, and
to its “multi-biometric” and “multi-attack” characteristics,
the proposed method presents some other very attractive
features such as: it is simple, fast, non-intrusive, user-
friendly and cheap, all of them very desirable properties
in a practical protection system.
All the previous results validate the “quality-difference”
hypothesis formulated in Section II: “It is expected that a
fake image captured in an attack attempt will have different
quality than a real sample acquired in the normal operation
scenario for which the sensor was designed.”
In this context, the present work has made several
contributions to the state-of-the-art in the field of biometric
security, in particular: i) it has shown the high potential of
image quality assessment for securing biometric systems
against a variety of attacks; ii) proposal and validation
of a new biometric protection method; iii) reproducible
evaluation on multiple biometric traits based on publicly
available databases; iv) comparative results with other
previously proposed protection solutions.
The present research also opens new possibilities for
future work, including: i) extension of the considered 25-
feature set with new image quality measures; ii) further
evaluation on other image-based modalities (e.g., palmprint,
hand geometry, vein); iii) inclusion of temporal information
for those cases in which it is available (e.g., systems work-
ing with face videos); iv) use of video quality measures
for video attacks (e.g., illegal access attempts considered
in the REPLAY-ATTACK DB); v) analysis of the features
individual relevance.
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